Fashadoo!

What good is history? What good is it to study bygone eras, artifacts and empires? Why should a man of the Modern study men of the Ancient? Nothing really can affect the past, so what good is it? The future is what is most important some would say, others would say the present. The past is the realm of the fascists and the nationalists. Though these groups are notorious for the glorification (and even deification) of the past, it is foolish to assume that it is immodern or illiberal to utilize the past. The past is the greatest force in society. It is the basis of all interaction and progress. History, if we use the bare definition of it as simply the past, is the foundation of all rational decision making. If we use the definition of history as an account or description of the past history still fulfills this role.

Take the following example. Actor A has a certain aversion to actor B. When asked "Why do you not like to spend time with actor B?", actor A must provide justification. He can provide any number of responses, but all of them will be, assuming that actor A is rational, will be rooted in some previous experience or warning. He might tell us that "Actor B hit me yesterday and so I fear him," or "I was told by my mother to stay away from him because he beat up actor G last week and he is dangerous and I fear him." He is making the decision to stay away from actor because he has either himself reasoned that there is a reason to do so or he has been told that there is a reason to keep away from him. There is a reason in either his own personal history or the history of other individuals that he trusts because he has known them to be historically worthy of trust. Other decisions (if they are made rationally) in life are based from similar thought processes. History is the basis of rational action.

One cannot act rationally without at least a minimal understanding of history. Even just knowing events in your recent history as an individual help you to make rational decisions. Anytime one places trust in another person they are using history to lead themselves. However, not all decisions are rational, many are emotional or romantic. The concept of "love at first site" has no basis in rationality. One generally cannot simply fall in love by seeing someone if they are acting entirely rational. Love grows over time and is a give-take reward system based in history; I love X because it has made (and continues to make) me feel Y. One might use their historical experience to justify love at first sight: "Individuals with X traits have made me feel Y in the past and so I love them."

Both previous examples have dealt primarily with the first definition of history. The second definition requires its own examples. Individuals do not always use their own history (their personal history) to justify their thinking or their actions. Often times they use second hand information and primary sources (the "word" of others) to justify themselves.

The first example is this: Student X wishes to apply to a competitive university but is not sure if it would be worth it to do so. So, X seeks counsel from student Z who has already gotten into the university and now works in the admissions department of the said university. Student Z tells student X that few students are accepted to the university. It is, student Z says, the policy of the university to reject 99 of every 100 applicants. Sometimes, student Z continues, applications are not even looked at before they are rejected. This has been the policy of the university for the past twenty years according to student Z. Based on this historical information student X decides not to apply to the university, feeling that it would be a waste of his application fee to potentially have his application tossed aside and not even looked at. He then applies to a slightly less competitive, yet academically inferior university and is accepted.

Another example is group prejudice. Let us say that group A is relatively isolated compared to group B. Group A lives in the mountainous interior of a country and group B lives in the fertile plains along the coast of the same country. Group A is told by group C, a group alien to the country of both group A and B, that group B is debaucherous and has no religion. To group A which is very religions this is despicable. Group C also tells group A that group B's women are promiscuous and have vaginas that are shaped like hearts. Few in group A have encountered members of group B and the few that have have not seen the crotches of the women. Group C goes on to tell group A that the people of group B are descended from the children of the devil. They provide a lengthy story about rituals that group B used to practice and about the many wars that group B and C have fought over territory and other pursuits. Group B is warlike and unlearned, says group C, They only care about killing and sex. Since group A is isolated and has little contact with group B, they believe all these stories, even if they are not true (because they do not know this). Group C is trusted by group A because of their long lasting contacts. It seems rational in the mind of the leadership of group A to ally with group C against group B because group B is violent and uncivilized and would probably try to conquer them and sell their women into some sort of sexual servitude. The account of the past of group B given to group A by group C is the information that they have to "go on". It leads them in their decisions and relations with group B. Group A will view group B as inferior to them based from descriptions of their past and present by group C. This is the effect of a given historical narrative.

History may be applied to all levels of humanity from the individual to the group. History is the leader in interpersonal and intercommunal affairs. History puts individuals and societies into context. Individuals and societies use history to justify and/or legitimize their actions and decisions.

Another use of history is understanding. History allows us to understand how we arrived where we are today and how we can stay here or leave here. Honest history, as I have said in a previous post, provides clarity of insight and allows us to evaluate our situation to the best of our ability. If we are honest with ourselves, we will find out the truth. For instance if a society falls into moral and economic decline, it does no good to make past times look like paradise. This is simplistic and foolish. Cold, hard and honest evaluation of previous times allows the society to understand (1) how it was able to be well off in the past, and (2) why it is no long this way. Attributing past glories to a sun god or to racial purity does nothing to ameliorate the present. In fact, it does more to deteriorate the present than anything else because it clouds understanding. It glosses over the root causes of decline with the paint of idiocy. History, we have said, is the foundation of all rational decision making. A society cannot progress without a clear and proper understanding of its past. If there is a clear understanding of a society's past successes, there will be a clear understanding of how to duplicate them; if there is a clear understanding of the causes of its decline in present times, there will be a greater understanding of how not to duplicate them.

This leads us to another point. History allows leaders to mobilize the masses. Leaders who clearly or cloudily understand history may mobilize the masses because they draw conclusions and derive solutions to problems from it. Recalling past glories and promising to duplicate them is the best way to excite and move a people deeply.

Politicians depend on history for precedent as well. Is a given course of action consistent with my society and political order's traditions and values? When has such an action been used? Does history say that it may be acceptable or not? History is the politician's best friend.

History has its applications to everyday life, perhaps moreso than any other subject taught in school. Its applications are far reaching and are present even if the individual does not realize them. This is what makes history the great subject that one can study.

I believe that historical narratives should be free of their author's opinions. History must be made up of unbiased and factual evidence. The author's heart must not speak, rather the facts must speak. Conclusions or judgments must, if they are made at all, be based from logical and clear reasoning. The best historical narrative is one that is devoid of opinions and romanticism. A historian has integrity if his conclusions are based in fact and not opinion. Just as a scientist does not interject his personal opinions into his lab reports (such an action would be considered farcical and dishonest), a historian should not interject his opinions of historical figures or happenings. History is the logical, honest and unbiased (to the best of one's ability) dissemination of knowledge.

On Taking Sides
A historian should not take sides in a narrative, never should he label one man "evil" or another man "good". That is not the job of a historian. That is the job of theologians, philosophers, and political scientists. In history there are no "good guys" and "bad guys". There is side A, side B, side C, and etc.

These variables are the "characters" in history. On side A there may be the Germans, on side B there may be the Swiss and on side C there might be the French. If one were to write a history of the relations between these three peoples, what would happen? Inevitably, some "historians" would paint the Germans as vindictive and chauvinist. They would portray them as enemies of democracy and liberalism. Another set of so-called-historians would portray the French as arrogant and uncouth. Still another set of historians would paint the Swiss as an island of calm in a sea of warring idiocy, a democratic paradise, deprived of social inequality and strife.

All these accounts would be wrong. Each would rely on selective information and would not provide complete pictures of their subjects. Each would deemphasize the flaws in the variable they most favored and would play up of the flaws in the sides they did not favor. In time, each account would decay into a polemic against some other account. Rather than looking at all sides uniformly, evaluating each variable with the same scrutiny and using all available resources to draw conclusions (or to allow the reader to draw conclusions on their own).

One might say that "History is written by the victors," and for the most part, they would be correct. However, the victors, if we assume that they are civilized and believe in any sort of lasting peace (a "just peace"), we are lead to believe that the victor has a moral duty to the conquered. Honesty is the best way to assure this intellectually. Intellectual honesty must permeate every academic pursuit. Thus, as the victors write history, they must keep in mind that there are deeper reasons for their newfound supremacy than inheritance or providence. In order to be just to the conquered people and their own people they must carefully and fully analyze their victory. If a victor is honest with himself as to why his has reached his position, he is more likely to be able to duplicate his victories (this is called "learning from history").

It is however difficult to be honest with oneself after a sweeping victory. If chieftain asks a sage after a rival tribe is defeated "Why have we defeated these people?" and the sage replies "Because you are blessed by the gods my lord," we can see an obvious problem. Such historical analyses are infantile and superficial. Instances in history do not simply "happen" for no reason, they do not create themselves. Individuals make them happen. There are to the best of anyone's knowledge tangible supernatural forces at work legislating who wins and who looses or who dies or who lives. Instead, there are varying belief systems that individuals believe cause such events. But the historian cannot succumb to such justifications. Instead he must use empirical data, such as primary and secondary sources, and all previous historical precedents leading to the one (ones) in question. History is the story of the past, of the world, the universe, ideas therein, men and women, their exploits and so forth. In history one is worldly. In theology one is supernatural. The historian must be a stoic observer. The natural order of things and how men react to it is what determines history. If a historian takes a side, that of the underdog or the victor, he deprives himself and human society from valuable information that could help human society to better react to the natural order and progress.

The historian's task is to disprove the notion that history is, as Napoleon called it "A set of lies agreed upon". It is to provide the most unbiased account of human events possible so that they may be learned from. All men have biases, as no man is totally perfect in any respect, but each is fully capable, unless they have been totally corrupted by idiocy, of minimizing and putting on the backburner their partialities to the best of their ability.

On the Application of History to Other Disciplines and Vis Versa
History is political. Many social sciences are political as well, and use history to make their point. History is a tool. History is applied to economics to better understand monetary trends, to science to understand trends in that discipline, to religion to better understand its motives, to politics to win elections more efficiently and so on. Few disciplines can be used to understand history. This is because history is the basis of the other disciplines to an extend. This is why history is "boring" to many students; it is the bare bottom of the academic fields. History enhances other disciplines, it allows social, political, economic, linguistic, etc. scientists to formulate their arguments and justify their theses. These sciences are made up of opinions that are justified through historical analyses.

History however does not work this way. History, in order to be effective, must be as free as possible from the corruptions of polemics. As the bedrock of the social sciences, history must be kept as sturdy as possible. If it is allowed to be corrupted by cloudy minded and nonsensical prejudicial sentiments. One should not write a history of a nation or region and seek to prove a thesis such as "A nation is superior to others." This would not be called A History of X nation, but rather A Farce of X nation! This is for the social historians, who are not true historians, but are much more sociologists. A history should provide proof as to why something happens and how it happens. It is a collection of facts arranged into a blueprint so that events may be properly understood. It is not open to opinions or emotions. The moment one applies his emotion or opinion to a narrative, it is no longer history, it becomes a part of some other discipline.

So then, history may be mixed into other disciplines, but other disciplines (for the most part), with a few exceptions, may not be applied to history. I will not discuss these exceptions. The greatest exception is "hard" science. Science aids in historical fact finding. It helps to uncover the truth.
Modern science is the greatest academic friend of history since the stylus. Forensics and radio carbon dating add to the historian's understanding of the past like nirvana adds to a monk's understanding of his god. Chemistry and physics tell the historian about advantages various variables may have over others within reason.

Another discipline that may be applied to history is philosophy or logistics. This allows the historian to make logical conclusions and reason through periods where little information is available. He is able to deduce from his evidence that x happened before y. This is the art of history.

Applying most other disciplines to history creates bias as these lead to faulty understanding. One sees this in ancient Greek historical texts, here politics pervades knowledge, and the enemies of the Greek states are painted as savage heathens (most notably the Persians). This has lead many Western historians to misunderstand ancient societies such as those of the Levant and Persia because there is such little information available on them and the only texts for the most part remaining are those of biased Greeks seeking to defame their Persian enemies. However, through modern science it has been determined that the ancient Persians were far more humane than the Greeks made them out to be. Everything becomes clear when politics is removed.

I have compiled a few of what I consider to be "key concepts" to the understanding of Algeria in relation to pan-Arabism. The nature of the relationship is important to consider, for it is the nature of Algeria's relations with the Arabic speaking world as well as the Middle East in general.

Algeria in the eyes of an Algerianist is a nation. It is not necissarily organic, but it is distinct from other nations and has been forged from years of occupation, liberation warfare, and civil conflict. It is a sombre nation. It is a nation that has had to stand alone when it comes to violence, a nation in which no "regional" (North African, Middle Eastern, Western or otherwise) powers cared to try and mediate in, one that knows its own strength. In terms of its language, there are usually considered to be two "national" languages, Tamazight (dialects) and Darja (Algerian Arabic)

In the eyes of an Arabist, Algeria is not a nation. It is a mere state, an Arab one, part of a larger Arab whole. Algerians do not have a specific identity or culture because their culture is the Arab culture alone. In this sense it also an Islamic nation. Algeria would not be a part of the Arab world without Islam. This is rooted in history; Algerians would not speak Arabic if there had not been the Arab conquest. Algerians would speak Amazigh dialects and probably other languages as well. There would be little basis for an Arabist to say that Arabic (MSA) should be the official language of Algeria if Algeria were not a primarily Muslim country. Arab nationalism does not believe in Algeria. It does not believe that Algeria should live. It believes that it should be swallowed into an empire ruled from Damascus or Baghdad or Cairo. Algeria is a means and not an end. It is a tool in a scheme of "Arab revival" and standing alone is "illigitamate".

Algeria was not considered to be an Arab country until the mid-1900's. Prior to this "Arabs" were south-west Asians. The "Arab nation" as described by the first Arab nationalists was non-sectarian and Asian. It was not African. "African Arabs" were considered impure bastardizations of a great civilization. Pan-Arabism is in its origin an Asian movement. Its roots lay in Syria-Lebanon and its founding fathers were Christian Arabophones from this region. These theorists sought to unchain themselves from the status quo of dhimmitude and unite with their Muslim neighbors for a fair chance in society. Bernard Lewis identifies a Maronite Lebanese by the name of Najib Azoury as one of the first exponents of secular pan-Arabism. Azoury's definition of the Arab world was the Levant and the Arabian penninsula. His, like the deginition of many of the original pan-Arabists, excluded African Arabs, Azoury called for "an Arab kingdom consisting of the Arabian penninsula and the Fertile Crescent. Egypt was specifically excluded in that the Egyptians were not Arabs by race" (pp. 161, From Babel to Dragomans, 2004, Oxford). If the Egyptians, who are the closest of the African Arabs to Asia, were not Arabs, then what were Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans and Mauritanians? Certainly they could not be Arabs. Lewis describes the view of Egyptians and other African Arabs in another section:

Egyptian involvement in pan-Arabism was at first a slow and gradual process. In the early stages of Arab nationalism Egypt was not felt to be part of the Arab world, either by the Egyptians themselves or by their Arab neighborsin south-west Asia. Pan-Arabism in its early form was confined --- in aspiration as well as in influence --- to the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian penninsula, the inhabitants of while were believed to be the "real Arabs." this definition excluded Egypt and the remaineder of the Arabic-speaking countries in the African continent. True the Egyptians spoke and wrote Arabic, but this, it was argued, did not make them Arabs any more than Americans were Englishmen or Mexicans were Spaniards.
(pp. 171)

So Algeria was not at all considered to be "Arab" at this point or for a large amount of time afterwards. Just how did Algeria come to be "Arab" then? The process and reasoning by which Algeria became "Arab" is important to understanding the Arabist view of it. This process is two fold in my opinion. One results from Middle Eastern Arab (Sunni) Muslim sectarianism and religiosity. The other results from feelings of indignation on the part of many Arab nationalists as they watched their "pure" form of Arabic decline and the military and political power of the so thought "racial Arabs". So then, North Africa, Somalia, Mauritania, Egypt (Arab Africa) were not included in the definition of "Arab" until two things occured; (1) Islam was factored into the idea of the Arab nation and (2) the "Arabs" of the Middle East became socially, militarily, and politically weak. I will discuss each.

The Inclusion of Islam:
Arab nationalism/pan-Arabism originally was a primarilly Levantine endevor. It was also promoted chiefly by Christians. Christians in the "Arab East" abound, but are few and far between in North Africa. In his book on the development and exploitation of Syrian nationalism, Daniel Pipes discusses the roots and growth of pan-Arabism from a largely secular Christian Levantine idea to a movment spanning across two continents and filled with Islamic overtones. Secular pan-Arabism could only appeal to a few groups, in a confined geographic setting. As said before, Arab nationalists at this time drew the line at Egypt. It was only with the infusion of this with Sunni Arab sentiments that pan-Arabism grew in geographic scope:

The Pan-Arabism of Christians was limited to Greater Syria and Iraq, but Sunni Arabs found this definition unnecessarily constricting, and they extended its scope. On adopting the ideology, they enlarged the definition of Arab to include the Arabian penninsula, then Egypt and North Africa, eventually even Somalia and Mauritania. By the 1970s, the "Arab nation" had grown to encompass Arabic speakers from Morocco to Oman. Sunnis also saw Arab unity as a smaller version of Muslim unity and imbued with an Islamic spirit and sensibilities.
(pp. 38, Pipes, Greater Syria, 1993, New York)

Thus, Islam is the great unifier. It is not race or even cutlure. There is no relation between Arabs and Somalis. Somalis do not even speak Arabic. They speak dialects of Afar. The same is true with Djibouti. North Africans speak a distant dialect of Arabic, but not "true" Arabic that resembles the written language as in Syria and Iraq. Only about 25% of Moroccans are "ethnic Arabs". The reason for the inclusion of such areas is based in Islam. Part of living in an Islamic society many Arabists say, is speaking Arabic. Thus, since these regions are heavily Muslim (almost entirely), and do speak a form of Arabic (let's remember as Sati' al-Husri said, anyone who is associated with the Arabs is an Arab!), they are part of the Arab world. The timing of their inclusion is also important. We can see that as time goes on, the newest members of the Arab nation are less and less Arab. The last was Djibouti, whose official language is Arabic, but the population is overwhelmingly ethnic Afar and non-Arab African and most of the people do not speak Arabic. Somalia came before and is very similar in this sense. Arabs make up a bare majority in Mauritania and many are not "Arab" at all, but are Africans or Bebers who were forced through conquest, slavery, and marriage to speak Arabic and became Muslim. Given this fact, Arabism when applied to Algeria cannot be truely secular, for it is not in the nature of the idea. A pattern continues back in time with new "memebers" of the nation (the Arab League is the official measure of "Arabness", each "Arab" country may join it and officially codify their Arabism). As this happened, the Arabs were becoming weaker. They needed allies. They needed help. This is the second reason.

Degradation and Fear:
As the Arabs lost the wars with Israel, fell into domestic rivalries, civil war and social degradation and so on, they sought to safe gaurd two things. First was their glorious language which had (and sitll) begun to unravel into a series of unintellagable dialects differing from state to state and even province to province or town/city to town/city. The second was their pride, their 'urubah, the memory of the glorious past. There could be no nation if there is no history to back it up (or so the nationalists said). Were are reminded by Elie Keddourie that "Nationalism [...] rests on the assumption that a nation must have a past. It also rests on another assumption, no less fundamental, namely, that a nation must have a future." (pp. 92-93, Kedourie ed. Nationalism in Africa and Asia, London, 1971) The preservation of the Arabic language assures the nationalists that the Arab nation will live on, possibly once again becoming an empire, unchalleged by its contemporaries. The Arabists know that the Arabic language is weak institutionally. Thus, they feel a need to safe gaurd it by making it the official language of the Arabic speaking states. The Arabic language, being the language of Islamic revalation, is an inseparable part of the glorious Arab past. In an ideal setting it would also be a part of the glorious Arab future. This is another component of why they push for Arabic at the highest levels. The Arabs of the Middle East further realized their military weakness in the face of puny Israel (1948, 1967, 1973, etc.) and against the "inferior" Iranians (1980-1988). Further, they saw their political power crumble on the world stage and realized that they could not fight their enemies on their own. This is where Islam comes into play, calling on not just Arabs to fight enemies of the Arab nation but Muslims in general and redefining enemies of the Arab nation as enemies of the Islamic ummah. There are three phases of this: (1) calling on other Arabs/Arabic speakers to fight the Israelis and battle for Middle Eastern Arab rights through speechs and sometimes by aiding them in fighting colonialism, (2) calling on other developing countries to fight their battles, and by (3) calling on other Islamic countries to fight their battles. Algeria was a part of the first phase in relation to Israel. It was part of the second stage in the over all pan-Arab context, not being added as a part of the Arab world until more than a decade after WWII. Bernard Lewis has an excellent explaination of the meaning that the institutionalization of the Arabic (MSA) language in the new Arab states:

The inclusion of pan-Arabism in the constitutions of the Arab states, alongside the guarantees of personal liberty, freedom of expression, etc., is perhaps a sign of its decline, for in this constitutional tradition, the enactment of political principles is a substitute for their enforcement, not a means of ensuring it.
(pp. 177, Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans)

In short, it is something that the Arab states did not really mean to enforce and believed in only half heartedly. In this passage Lewis is saying that pan-Arab unity, like freedom of exression and other civil liberties in Arab countries is not meant sincerely. There is the prospect of pan-Arabism, but not necissarily the will. The Arab leaders had mostly given up on solely Arab unity and freedom but wanted to give these goals one last try in hopes of someday reviving the Arab nation. Further, the Arab states fragmented. There was no unity in opinion or even policy (except for the rejection of Israel) among them. The Arab states became self serving and cared not for each other. Countries that were on the perriphery of the original Arab world (consisting of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, the Gulf, etc.) became even more perripheral. Middle Eastern states pretended not see civil wars in Sudan, Somalia, Algeria and other states. They pretended that even though their emirates were wealthy enough so that half of their work forces could be unengaged and unemploye by law, they could spare any change to aid their "Arab brothers" dying of famine and disaster in North Africa. The Arab spirit died. With it so too did the Arab nation die. Today there is no Arab nation. There are places where dialects of Arabic are spoken, where arrogant élites force their view of Arabism on their people, often to their detriment. But no longer are there gallant Arabs riding into battle on the backs of white Arabian horses to save the world from ignorance. Today's "Arabs" peddle as Bob Marely might have said "brain wash education, to make us the fools" so that they may take advantage of ignorance and poverty. Today's Arab leaders are not knights, they are predators, they are vultures that feed on human misery. They have created a poltical model that fosters rot and death. At its worst this order is out right fascist and pseudo-Nazi (ie Ba'thi states) and at the very best is pretentious and deceptive (Algeria).

Algeria operates within the political framework of the Vultures. It looks not to modern or progressive models of state craft and political culture, but to the backward and decaying order of the Middle East. Arabism (the military dictatorship under a Vangaurd who leads the nation to glory), Islamism (the violent and barbaric ideology that aims to create an Islamic Republic as in Iran) and organic nationalism have nearly destroyed Algeria. This is not far from the goals of these ideas though. Arabism seeks to dissolve Algeria into a wider Arab empire, subserviant to far off rulers (similar to the status of Syria in the UAR). Islamism seeks to bring Algeria hundreds of hundreds of years back in terms of progress. Both have succeeded in ruining some part of Algerian life. The only way forward is to break the Middle Eastern political model. This means orienting Algeria away from the political wids of the Middle East, not sticking its neck out when there is nothing to gain (as in the Iran-Iraq War when beligerents shot down Algerian diplomats who were supposed to be neutral), not limiting economic opportunities for the sake of bigotry (as in not having relations with Israel), not adopting every backward idea that gets kicked up from under a falafel stand (Arabism, Islamism, socialism etc.) and not supressing minority opinions or communal groupings for the sake of a language that is practically foreign to Algeria (MSA). Algeria cannot move forward unless it knows itself, and unless it embraces itself, Amazigh, Arab, cosmopolitan, Muslim, athiest and all the rest. It cannot progress unless it stops pretending to be what it is not. It is not Middle Eastern. It is not a part of the Arab world. The so-called Arabs would embrace it if this were the case, they would invest there money there, they would try to make peace there (instead of agitating and supporting the heathens that tore the country apart *cough*cought* Gulf *cough*cough*), they would help it when it is in need and not stand idly by as it falls apart. The Arabs, if Algeria were a part of their domain, would pay it some mind and show it some respect. No nation can stand with pride if it is a tool. Those who believe that Algeria is truely a part of the Arab world should ask themselves, Where are the Arabs when Algeria needs help? What good has Arabism brought Algeria? How many promises did they make, and how many did they break?

Final Thoughts:
If you do a Google image search on "Arabism" you come across an interesting picture. Here it is:

I have no idea what the context of this picture is. There is another smaller one here. It seems to be Ba'thi (using the Ba'thi colors and flag). It places nationalists generally in their place of geographic origin, Nasir in Egypt, Asad in Syria, Saddam in Iraq, Ben Bella in Algeria. It reads (in English) "Oh Arabs...dare you forget your fathers?" We must not. The vultures pictured here are the fathers of the Arabs of today. They are vindictive, violent, backward and hateful. We must remember that we must do our best to not be like these "fathers." Instead we should pave a road of individualism and freedom. We must burn their bridges and create our own. In their eyes, Algeria was nothing more than a tool to be used and then tossed away. Is that right?

As I have said many times, the experience of Arab Americans and American Muslims and that of European Arabs and Muslims differ greatly. I am of the firm opinion that in terms of social mobility, economic opportunity and racial and ethnic integration, in the industrialized and wealthy West it doesn't really get much better than the United States of America. The US has its problems, but its better than most other places and its culture and society is far more malleable than that of most of Europe or elsewhere. It is a society of immigrants and it is a free society, economically, socially and politically. It is truly pluralistic.

I came across an article this morning that confirms my opinion. There is less ghettoization of Muslims and Arabs in the United States and while there is discrimination and ignorance, its still not as difficult to get a job or start a business here as it is in Europe. The article contrasts the American and Franco-European models,

Arab and Muslim immigrants in the US generally identify themselves as Americans and integrate with relative ease into a society that prides itself on social mobility and has more tolerance for cultural and religious differences, Haddad said.

"To identify as French you have to renounce your faith and have to renounce your previous identity as though your previous self didn't exist. In the US you don't have to," she said.

You have that option, but it isn't generally expected and isn't written into law. There's less of a feeling of threat against religion and culture here.

The article also confirms other hypotheses of mine; that Arabs and Muslims here are less isolated, and more diverse; that the riots are not Islamically oriented or in reaction to some foreign affairs problem or something of that sort. Further it also touches upon an issue that few commentators have, and that is the nature of European "identity" based from language and ethnicity and other illiberal and romantic concepts.

Arab Americans and Muslims are better educated and have a higher income than the national average, said Edina Lekovic, communications director for the Muslim Public Affairs Council.

"There's no clear connection between the European and the American Muslim experience," she said, explaining that Muslims in the United States are less isolated and homogeneous than their European counterpart.

[...]

"French Muslims are not responding to the issues of Palestine or Iraq. They are responding to their domestic situation."

[...]

"It's the act of an underclass with expectations that have gone unfulfilled for a long period of time striking out, out of a combination of despair and anger," he said in a telephone interview.

France and other European countries have maintained a national identity that is tied to ethnicity while the American identity has shifted over time as waves of immigrants reshape the country.

"As long as these kids grow up not only in an economic underclass but excluded from being French or Dutch it's problematic," Zogby said. "When people in my community get angry about American foreign policy they get angry as citizens and they fight back as citizens. The process is more open to including them."

Amin. Arab (and Muslim) Americans are not part of a volk, and neither is anybody else that is a part of the American nation. America is a community of citizens and potential citizens, all living by the same social contract. This is the greatest way to run a society, based from citizenship, not tied to any for of religion or "national spirit. There is no supernatural religion that all citizens must be a part of, nor is there the religion of shallow modernists, organic/romantic ethno-linguistic nationalism. Any society based upon generalizations of what the people should be, rather than what they are, is going to have serious problems when it comes to integration and adjustment. These riots just confirm to me that romantic nationalism is evil. The youths in Europe are fighting against a volk, whether they realize it or not, they are fighting romanticism. The modern world and romanticism do not mesh.

Addendum:
Amir Taheri has an excellent piece in Asharq Alwasat about the riots. He states that there is a "culture clash" between Muslims and native Frenchmen because both come from universalist civilizations. He sums up by essentially stating that something's got to give. There has to be a cultural compromise:

Assimilation is far more difficult now because the Arab and African Muslim communities are neither European nor Christian. They may be prepared to become a bit more European but would demand that, in exchange, other Frenchmen also become a bit more like them. In other words what they demand is a new French identity, a synthesis of the traditional concept of Frenchness with new Arab, African and Islamic ones. You cannot play multiculturalism without admitting the possibility that your own culture may, at some point, be affected by other cultures, including ones that were once regarded as alien or even threatening.

Read the rest here.

The former leader of the Lebanese Maronite Lebanese Forces militia, Samir Geagea was release from prison after eleven years. Gaegea was the only militia leader held responsible for assasinations and attrocities commited by his militia, no other milita or militia leader did any hard time for the civil war. This situation leads one to view Geagea as a political prisoner of the Syrian occupation. It's not hard to see really. Certainly the fact that Geagea and his militia were "anti-Syrian" aids this point of view. I think most people know this, but there are some who probably know it and deny it. Like the authorities. Michel Aoun was exiled from Lebanon to France and was recently allowed to return (a few weeks after the Syrian withrawl) but did not do hard solitary confinement like Geagea did. I view this as one of the first steps towards the full exit from Lebanon of Syrian political influence.

In other news, we got a threat from Al Qaeda out there threatening to kill one of the Algerian diplomats that they are holding hostage. From Aljazeera online:

æÝí ÅØÇÑ ÊØæÑÇÊ ÞÖíÉ ÇáÏÈáæãÇÓííä ÇáÌÒÇÆÑííä åÏÏ ÊäÙíã ÃÈæ ãÕÚÈ ÇáÒÑÞÇæí Ýí
ÈíÇä áå Úáì ÇáÅäÊÑäÊ ÈÞÊá ÇáÞÇÆã ÈÇáÃÚãÇá ÇáÌÒÇÆÑí Úáí ÈáÚÑæÓí æÇáÏÈáæãÇÓí ÇáÂÎÑ
ÚÒ ÇáÏíä ÈáÞÇÖí ÇááÐíä ÇÎÊØÝÇ Ýí ÈÛÏÇÏ ãäÐ ÎãÓÉ ÃíÇã.

**And within the framework of the developments on the issue of the Algerian
diplomats Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's organization, in a statement on the Internet,
threatened the killing of the Algerian chargé d'affaires. (that's Mr.
Belaroussi)

The article also says that the group posted photographs of the two Algerians online. It goes on to say that the Iraqis have captured men connected to the kidnapping and that the Algerian government has announced its withdrawl of remaining diplomats. So it's over. No more Algerian diplomatic services in Iraq. Makes me sick. Are we going to even get these two back anyway? Probably not.

This story from El Watan almost made me cry...well not really but it did make me feel really "sorry" for the families of those two Algerian diplomats savagely kidnapped in Iraq. More angry than anything else actually. This part really got to me:

La petite-fille de Ali Belaroussi joue avec un chapeau aux couleurs bleu
etjaune du Brésil. Quand on lui demande quand son grand-père rentre, elle
n’hésitepas : « Ghadwa ! Demain ! » Et le reste de la famillequi suit en chœur :
« In ch’Allah ! »

**The grand-daughter of Ali Belaroussi plays with a hat with the colors
blueand yellow of Brazil. When she is asked when her grandfatherreturns, without
hesitation she says: "Ghadwa! Tomorrow! "And the rest ofthe family follows in
chorus: "In ch'Allah! " ("Inshallah" or "God willing")

Ugh. Let them go.

Addendum: Liberte-Algerie is reporting that the Algerian government is bending for the heathens. Bachir Belhaj (the last high ranking diplomat left at the embassy in Baghdad) and the wife of the kidnapped chargé d' affaires, Ali Belaroussi have been repatriated to Algeria.

Ce rapatriement dont il convient de relever qu’il s’agit du dernier
diplomate en poste, laisse suggérer donc que l’Algérie a décidé de fermer son
ambassade dans la capitale irakienne même si officiellement tel n’est pas le
cas. Seule précision du canal officiel : M. Belhadj, qui devait achever
normalement sa mission dans la capitale irakienne, en cette fin du mois de
juillet, et Mme Belaroussi sont arrivés à Amman avant de poursuivre leur voyage
vers Alger. Quelles pourraient bien être les motivations d’Alger pour rapatrier
M. Belhadj et Mme Belaroussi ? Si, bien entendu, la détérioration de la
situation sécuritaire à Bagdad, devenue un véritable enfer, peut, à première
vue, expliquer en partie ce retour au bercail du diplomate, il n’en demeure pas
moins que des zones d’ombre persistent. Alger, à travers ce geste, veut-elle
donner le maximum de chance à la libération de nos deux diplomates ?

**This repatriation of which it should be noted that it is about the last
diplomat in place, thus suggests that Algeria decided to close its embassy in
the Iraqi capital even if officially such is not the case. Only precision
of the official channel: Mr. Belhadj, who was to complete his mission in the
Iraqi capital normally, at the end of this July, and Mrs. Belaroussi
arrived in Amman before continuing their voyage towards Algiers. Which could be
the motivations of Algiers to repatriate Mr. Belhadj and Mrs. Belaroussi? If, of
course, the deterioration of the sedentary situation in Baghdad, becomes a true
hell, can, at first sight, partly explain this return to the fold of the
diplomats, it does not remain about it less than zones of shade persist. Does Algiers, through this gesture, want to give the maximum of chance to
the release of our two diplomats?

I think it does. I don't think it will work, but I think it's the intention. Foreign Minister Mohamed Bedjaoui said, after all, that the government "il fait tout ce qu’il peut pour que les deux ressortissants puissent être libérés”/"does all that it can so that the two nationals can be released ". I think this is really all that they either feel like they can do or really can do. What, are they going to invade Iraq? They're going to send in the highly trained Algerian special ops units to Al Anbar? That just means "We're getting ready to announce our cowardice and still probably not get our men back" or maybe "We're going to get them back but we won't have any pride left after." Again, ugh. Yes, I'm a teenager. Yes, I'm angsty.